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The recent financial crisis has placed the research focus on firms’ indebtedness and 
resilience in adverse circumstances. As indicators of the economic situation, the literature 
uses measures, such as default risk, which integrates various firm characteristics, 
including firm performance, leverage and the capacity to generate future resources. These 
features are part of the decision-making process, where company ownership structure is 
a relevant factor (Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and therefore plays a decisive 
role in explaining default risk. However, few papers mention ownership structure, 
including ownership type, as a determinant of the firms’ probability to fail. We focus on 
the interaction of two different types of shareholders, family and institutional investors. 
According to research findings for a large set of economies around the world (Morck et 
al., 2005), most companies owned by an ultimate owner are family firms. Even in 
countries with low ownership concentration, such as the U.S., family owners exercise 
significant control over listed companies (Villalonga and Amit, 2009), contributing 
significantly to GDP and employment in the U.S.  
One of the most frequently addressed topics in the family business literature, both, 
theoretically and empirically, is the relationship between family firms and their risk-
taking behaviour through their policies on innovation, R&D investments, acquisitions, 
leverage and internationalization (Chrisman and Patel, 2012; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 
2000; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2018; Keasey et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2008). However, most 
previous works treat the issue uni-dimensionally, thereby drawing only a partial, albeit 
specialized, view of the decision-making process. The firm’s probability to fail instead 
enables analysis of the company’s global situation; that is, not just its leverage and thereby 
its insolvency probability, but also its investment and other firm’s policies that picture its 
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potential future operational performance. Therefore, we analyse the firms’ default risk, 
which is the final outcome of their risk-taking.   
Under the universal approach adopted in the family business literature, there exists 
the assumption of an inverse relationship between family ownership and default risk, 
based on the traditional association between family owners and risk aversion. 
Nevertheless, we find a general absence of papers directly testing this relationship. Our 
study explores this association and considers some aspects that affect the initial approach 
and thus condition the findings for the aforementioned relationship. The significant 
presence of institutional investors might influence, and thus alter predictions for, the 
behaviour of family owners. The relationship could also be affected by the stability of 
these institutional shareholders and possible adverse financial events. We test our 
hypotheses on a sample of publicly-traded U.S. firms over a period of 15 years, finding, 
as anticipated, that family ownership reduces default risk, albeit to a lesser degree in the 
presence of high institutional ownership, which can result in conflict between family and 
non-family members, thereby increasing the firm’s probability of failure. This moderating 
effect further intensifies with greater stability of institutional holdings and in times of an 
economic downturn. 
The study contributes to the literature in different ways. First, we include the family 
ownership structure as a relevant factor in the decision-making process involved in 
funding and investment choices (Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) which 
ultimately determine their default risk. As emphasized by Hoskisson et al. (2017), the 
consequences of managerial risk-taking still attract less research attention than its 
antecedents. Despite the predominance of the family businesses and their implications for 
the economy, little attention has been paid to the relationship between family firms and 
default risk, which is the result of several corporate decisions. Some papers have 
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considered ownership structure as a key determinant of default risk (Barry et al., 2011; 
Bonsall et al., 2017; Chiang et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2017) but pay 
no attention to family ownership. One paper that takes into account the effect of family 
ownership on the probability of failure is the work by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007). 
However, these authors apply their study to a particular framework of private family 
firms. Our paper considers a wider context of public companies from different sectors.  
The second contribution of this paper is to consider the role in default risk played by 
family owners of firms in shared ownership with investors entirely focused on financial 
goals, when the family’s also include non-financial objectives. While previous studies 
have analysed the relationship among different types of shareholders and its effect on 
firm value, to the best of our knowledge, previous literature has not studied changes in 
risk attitude among family investors in the presence of other shareholders, such as 
institutional investors. Furthermore, we consider two conditioning factors of the 
moderating role of institutional investors. One is investor type, i.e., long- or short-term 
oriented; the other is adverse circumstances, such as an economic downturn. To offer a 
wider picture of the effect of family ownership on default risk, we draw on the 
Socioemotional Wealth (SEW) perspective, to expand on the Agency Theory (AT). The 
findings suggest that, ceteris paribus, family ownership reduces firm’s default risk. 
However, as predicted by SEW perspective, the attitude of family owners towards risk 
changes with the frame of reference. When family shareholders see their non-economic 
goals threatened by the presence of institutional investors, they may be led towards 
decisions that could increase the firm’s probability of failure.  
Third, as mentioned above, the consequences of the company's risk-taking decisions 
are reconciled into a single measure. This is an explicit analysis of the probability of 
default, in contrast to previous studies which consider only one of its explanatory 
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variables, such as return volatility (Gürsoy and Aydoğan, 2002), performance volatility 
(Boubaker et al., 2016), investment in risky projects (R&D) (Boubaker et al., 2016), or 
leverage (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2000). As a proxy of default risk we use the Black-
Scholes-Merton measure (hereafter referred to as BSM), which estimates the probability 
of default using the market prices of the company's shares and leverage. With respect to 
the choice of default risk measure, when compared with the accounting-based indicators, 
such as the Altman's (1968) Z-score used in Barry et al. (2011), the BSM measure has the 
advantage of incorporating, not only past information, but also investors’ expectations for 
future asset performance, by using the market prices of shares. The BSM also takes into 
account stock-return volatility. In comparison with the debt-related instruments, such as 
bond spreads, Credit Default Swaps spreads or credit ratings, used in Bhojraj and 
Sengupta (2003), the BSM measure affords the further advantage of widespread 
availability. Finally, compared to hazard rates obtained with Cox (1972) regression, used 
in Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007), the BSM measure does not depend on the availability of 
default events, nor on the variables chosen to explain the waiting time until default. As 
already mentioned, this measure takes as inputs the market value of the stocks of the 
company and the volatility of their returns and its leverage. Thus, this default risk proxy 
considers the two types of risks explained by Kempers et al. (2017), variability, usually 
measured as firm’s volatility on performance or returns, and vulnerability, typically 
measured by financial and accounting ratios. We must remark that other measures such 
as the Altman Z-score or the Ohlson’s (1980) O-score only consider vulnerability risk.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the 
theoretical arguments and hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes the database and 
the default risk measure. Section 4 includes the methodology and results and Section 5 
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presents some robustness checks and extensions. Finally, Section 6 highlights the main 
conclusions of the work as well as its main practical implications. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Family ownership is one of the corporate governance mechanisms examined in the 
AT literature for its role in controlling risk-taking by top-level executives (Hoskisson et 
al., 2017). In a risk-taking context, non-alignment between shareholders' and managers' 
interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) translates into different predispositions towards 
risk. Shareholders with a significant stake in the business can prevent the “free-rider 
problem” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) and have the capability and motivation to monitor 
management. Information asymmetries are characteristically lower in family firms since 
shareholders have better access to private information. This increases their capacity to 
monitor managers (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2000; Barry et al., 2011), and hence, 
influence risk-taking. This is consistent with the “efficient monitoring” hypothesis 
presented by Pound (1988), which states that better-informed shareholders have more 
capacity to monitor their target companies.  
According to the AT, firms controlled by less diversified shareholders have a strong 
concern for firm survival, which is especially relevant for family businesses (Boubaker 
et al., 2016) that put their personal wealth on the firm and have a long-term orientation 
(Miller et al., 2008). Therefore, family firms are more risk averse than non-family firms.  
 As well as from the traditional AT approach, risk-taking has been studied from a 
behavioural perspective, being the SEW perspective a reference in the family business 
literature. Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) define SEW as the “non-financial aspects of the firm 
that meet the family’s affective needs, such as identity, the ability to exercise family 
influence, and the perpetuation of the family dynasty”. Under this perspective, SEW is 
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considered as the reference point for the firm’s risk-taking behaviour based on the 
judgement of the family owner (Casillas et al., 2019) whose aim is to avoid losing any of 
the above SEW components. Therefore, family firms aim to protect their SEW and are 
found to be less risk seeking (Chrisman and Patel, 2012).  
As already stated, the special characteristics of family owners make them more likely 
to be conservative, motivated and able to control risk-taking by managers. AT and the 
SEW perspective, agree that the family firm becomes less risk-seeking when operating in 
a gain frame, that is, when the firm’s expected outcome is above a reference level. 
Therefore, family members will not promote any action that fosters risk-taking for fear 
of placing the firm’s SEW at risk.  
In general terms, we posit that, the high risk-aversion, conservative attitudes and 
motivation to monitor the actions of managers contribute to lower default risk. Based on 
these arguments, we propose the following baseline hypothesis: 
H1: Family ownership reduces default risk.  
2.1. The Moderating Role of Institutional Investors on the Family Ownership – Default 
Risk Relationship 
Certain situations could affect the high risk-aversion and conservative attitudes of 
family owners; therefore, the inverse relationship between family owners and default risk 
is not set in stone. 
As already stated, family firms characteristically exercise control over their managers 
thereby avoiding agency costs arising from problems with the alignment of interests. 
However, the coexistence of family owners with other investors in the firm places these 
firms in the peculiar context of fractional ownership. According to AT, differences 
between the various owners of the firm are settled by means of voting rights, assuming 
board members to act professionally and independently. This is a doubtful assumption in 
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family firms, where managerial entrenchment is high. Schulze et al. (2001) state that 
fractional ownership does not necessarily minimize the problem of agency costs, and can 
even exacerbate it; and Schulze et al. (2003) probe the theme of fractional ownership and 
the clash of interests between the various owners when one is a family owner intent on 
maintaining control. A similar problem occurs when there is a combination of family 
ownership (owner-manager) and institutional ownership (outside owners) with interest in 
monitoring the managers. 
Institutional investors hold highly diversified investment portfolios and thanks to 
their size and economies of scale, they have easier and cheaper access to professional 
information services (Salganik-Shoshan, 2016). This privileged position enables them to 
use more refined investment selection criteria than are available to individual investors 
(James and Karceski, 2006), and, as a result, they are classed as sophisticated investors 
(Collins et al., 2003). This set of characteristics (diversification, easier access to 
information and sophistication) makes institutional investors more willing to take greater 
risk in the hope of obtaining higher returns (Barinov, 2017; Bushee, 2001; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) which may contribute to creating a corporate risk-taking culture (Barry 
et al., 2011). With respect to the possibility of controlling risk-taking, several papers 
highlight the influence of institutional investors on management decision-making 
(Collins et al., 2003; Chiang et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2015; Pukthuanthong et al., 2017), 
and their role in monitoring managers (Evans and Fahlenbrach, 2012) to mitigate myopic 
and opportunistic behaviour and agency costs. Udin et al. (2017) and Switzer et al. (2018) 
cite managerial monitoring by owners as having an attenuating effect on the probability 
of default, as empirically supported by Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003).  
Our aim is to determine whether fractional ownership with this type of composition 
creates agency problems or family firms are able to align the interests of all parties in the 
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ownership structure and reach a consensus on investment criteria. The two types of 
shareholder (family and institutional owners) have different views on what makes a good 
investment and how much risk is worth taking. By investing their own wealth in the 
business, family owners become emotionally attached to the firm (Tilba and McNulty, 
2013), whereas institutional investors are more detached and thus able to put their own 
aims above the firm’s interests, and may urge the family to seek higher profit through 
risk-taking (George et al., 2005). 
Schulze et al. (2003) acknowledge shortcomings in the AT explanation for agency 
problems in family firms with a degree of outside ownership, emphasizing the need to 
turn to behavioural economic theory. The SEW perspective shows that firms are not 
always risk averse, since risk-taking decisions depend on how they are framed. Family 
firms are more likely to take risks when their actual wealth is under threat, and less likely 
to do so in the absence of such a threat. In the presence of outside owners focused entirely 
on economic gain, family owners may see their non-economic goals under threat and 
move to protect their SEW, even though this could ultimately affect the firm’s chances of 
survival. Combining these arguments, we posit that, in the presence of institutional 
investors willing to interfere in the management and control of the business, family 
owners take decisions that conflict with the goals of institutional investors and lead to 
higher default risk. Thus, our second hypothesis is: 
H2a. The effect of family ownership on default risk is positively moderated by the 
significant presence of institutional owners. 
The likelihood of family owners’ protection of non-economic goals leading to 
conflicts with institutional investors can increase under certain conditions. Firstly, as 
Sakaki and Jory (2019) point out, the involvement of institutional investors depends not 
only on the proportion but also on the stability of their holdings. Thus, institutional 
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investors can be typified by their degree of portfolio diversification and the depth of their 
investment horizon. Stable long-term institutional investors have strong incentives and 
more power to monitor companies internally (Pukthuanthong et al., 2017) while short-
term, diversified institutional investors are more interested in obtaining short-term profits 
than in improving management (Jafarinejad et al., 2015). When institutional owners are 
motivated to take control of the firm’s management, they are more likely to conflict with 
family shareholders. Based on the above reasoning, we predict that the conflict will be 
greater with institutional investors who have a large share of ownership and more 
permanent, long-term business goals, while the opposite will occur with more diversified, 
temporary institutional investors. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2b. The positive moderating influence of the significant presence of institutional 
owners in the family ownership – default risk relationship is greater in the case of long-
term than short-term institutional owners.  
Secondly, the SEW perspective suggests that, when business continuity is at risk, 
family firms will do anything they can to survive and thus preserve the non-economic 
wealth derived from the business (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Under this premise, family 
firms’ priorities and decisions change depending on their point of reference (situational 
factors) at different moments in time. As noted by Chrisman and Patel (2012), family 
businesses with large SEW endowments become more pro-active and take riskier 
decisions when unfavourable circumstances threaten the firm’s survival. In order to save 
their SEW, family firms may avoid more traumatic measures by resorting to retrenchment 
strategies2 (Casillas et al., 2019). They avoid dismissing personnel (Miller and Le Breton-
Miller, 2005) and opt for internal rather than external transfer of ownership (Wennberg 
 
2 Retrenchment can be defined as the deliberate reduction of assets and/or costs as a means of increasing 
profits (Lim et al., 2013). 
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et al., 2011). Any alternative, that is, in the form of cut-back measures, may take their toll 
on relationships between the family and its employees (Miller et al., 2008), damage both 
the firm and the family reputation, convey signals of mismanagement and business 
failure, which is particularly alarming for family firms (Shepherd et al., 2009), or damage 
customer relationship and shake customer loyalty (Miller et al., 2008).  
Therefore, we propose that under adverse circumstances, such as economic 
downturns, which threaten the SEW of family owners, the decisions they take in order to 
protect their non-economic goals clash more directly with institutional investors than they 
would under normal circumstances. Thus, we posit the following hypothesis: 
H2c. The positive moderating influence of the significant presence of institutional 
owners in the family ownership – default risk relationship is greater during economic 
downturns than under normal economic conditions.  
3. Database and Default Risk Measure 
3.1. Database 
The financial and market data for this study, which are drawn from the Thomson 
Financial database, refer to all stocks listed in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for 
the period 2002-2016. After screening to remove banks, finance and insurance companies 
because of the peculiarities of their capital structure, which might skew the desired default 
risk data, the sample is limited to firms that checked YES in the “Primary quote” field 
and listings with Type not equal to Equity. The availability of data needed to calculate 
the BSM measure also had an impact, reducing the final sample to 1,132 companies. 
The ownership data was taken from the Bureau Van Dijk Osiris database, which 
includes the number of voting rights per shareholder with more than 0.01% of the shares. 
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As well as the percentage of shares held, it also gives the type of investor for every year 
of the sample period. 
Firms with no available data on the variables of interest (described in the 
methodology section) and outliers above and below the 99th and 1st percentiles, 
respectively, were removed. The selection is also restricted to companies with at least 
four years consecutive data, so as to enable computation of the m2 statistic, as explained 
below. The final dataset comprises 541 companies and has a total of 4,271 observations 
for a 15-year study period. 
3.2. Measuring Default Risk 
As we have mentioned before, we are proxying default risk by using the so-called 
Black-Scholes-Merton measure, that has also been used by Vassalou and Xing (2004), 
Byström et al. (2005) and Byström (2006), among others. Thus, it starts from Merton’s 
(1974) proposal, which is to consider the firm’s own equity value as a European call 
option on its assets value, and then use the Black and Scholes (1973) formula to calculate 
the value.  
The default probability is calculated as the probability that the firm’s assets will be 
less than the book value of the firm’s liabilities at debt’s maturity. If the theoretical 
distribution implied by Merton’s model is assumed, which is the Normal distribution, the 
theoretical probability of default is given by the following expression (see Vassalou and 



















































where 𝑉𝐴,𝑡 is the value of the firm’s assets at time t, t  is the expected immediate rate of 
return on 𝑉𝐴,𝑡, tA, is asset return volatility, tD  is the debt’s face value, T is the maturity 
period and N(·) is the cumulative probability of the Normal distribution.  Due to its 
derivational origin, this measure is also known as the Black-Scholes Merton or BSM 
measure.  
To find the values of tAV ,  and tA,  we use an iterative process starting from the 
market price of the firm’s shares and its stock-return volatility, as one used by Abinzano 
et al. (2014). Furthermore, in line with other studies, we calculate the book value of debt 
as short-term debt plus 50% of long-term debt3 and the time to maturity is set to one year4.  
Furthermore, we use the risk-free rate to obtain the implied asset value. Since we are 
considering default probability over the course of one year, we take the market yield on 
U.S. Treasury securities at one-year constant maturity for the whole of the study period. 
In keeping with the nature of the study, we use monthly data for the different variables. 
Following Vassalou and Xing (2004), we overcome the problem of reporting delays, by 
not using the book value of accounting variables for the new fiscal year until 4 months 
have elapsed. 
Thus, the advantage of the BSM measure over accounting-based models is that, as 
well as considering past data it uses the market price of the shares, thereby incorporating 
investors’ expectations for future share performance. It also takes into account asset return 
volatility. Hillegeist et al. (2004) compare it in this respect with Altman’s (1968) Z and 
Ohlson’s (1980) O-score, finding that the BSM measure provides significantly more 
 
3 Short-term debt is the Datastream variable “Short term debt & current portion of long term debt”, which 
represents that portion of debt payable within one year including current portion of long term debt and 
sinking fund requirements of preferred stock or debentures, while long-term debt is Datastream’s “Long 
term debt”, which includes all interest bearing financial obligations, excluding amounts due within one 
year.  
4 See, for example, Crouhy et al. (2000), Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Gharghori et al. (2006). 
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information about the firm’s default risk than either of the others. Consequently, they 
recommend the use of the BSM measure instead of traditional accounting-based measures 
as a default probability proxy. In addition to the advantages already explained in the 
introduction, with respect to the debt-related indicators, such as bond spreads or Credit 
Default Swaps spreads, and to credit rating, BSM requires only a minimum amount of 
information and are thus available for all firms, not just those that are credit-rated or have 
a CDS issued on them. 
4. Methodology and Results 
4.1. Estimation Method 
In view of the lack of studies modelling the relationship between family ownership 
and default risk, this paper examines this association following Wang et al.’s (2015) 
proposal together with some of the control variables used in Chiang et al. (2015) and 
Wang et al. (2017). The model is estimated using panel data methodology.  
Our benchmark model is given by the following equation: 
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗+𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
The dependent variable, DefaultRiski,t, is the default risk of firm i in year t  proxied 
by the BSM measure (expression 1). 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is a continuous variable which captures 
the actual percentage of family voting rights in the firm5. The variable 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡is a 
 
5 FamOwn is measured as the percentage of voting rights owned by those shareholders catalogued in the 
database as “family” owners. Due to the database limitation, it is possible that the percentages of members 
pertaining to different families are summed together. Future research could start from an extended database 
which allows us to include the coexistence between family owners and another family group with a 




dummy variable which takes a value of one when the level of institutional ownership is 
high, i.e., above the mean; and zero otherwise. The interaction term is not included in 
Hypothesis 1, and the benchmark model is used to test Hypothesis 2a. In order to test 
Hypothesis 2b, following Bushee (2001) we substitute the variable 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 with two 
types of institutional investors, contrasting in terms of their portfolio diversification and 
stability. One is bank trusts (BT) and the other is institutional advisors (IA) including 
investment funds, private equity, venture capital and hedge funds. BT and IA are dummy 
variables that take the value 1 if the participation of bank trusts or that of institutional 
advisors, respectively, are above the mean, and zero otherwise. Finally, finding the 
financial crisis of 2008 to provide an interesting context for analysing the effect of an 
economic downturn placing firms in difficult circumstances, we introduce a dummy 
variable, Crisist, which takes a value of 1 for the years 2008 and 2009, and zero otherwise, 
enabling us to test Hypothesis 2c. 
The model also includes a set of control variables based on what the literature has 
considered the determinants of default risk (Blume et al., 1998; Kaplan and Urwitz, 1979).  
The first of these control variables, SIZE, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets 
in thousands, represents firm size, which is expected to be positively related to default 
risk. The second is, ROA, the return on assets, which represents firm profitability. Firms 
drawing higher revenue from their operating activities will generate higher profits and 
therefore present less default risk. LEV represents firm leverage measured as the ratio of 
debt to total assets, with higher debt ratios generating higher levels of default risk. VOLAT 
is the variability of returns measured as the standard deviation of the stock returns for the 
past twelve months. Since higher variability will lead to higher risk, the relationship with 
default risk is expected to be positive. CAPEX, capital expenditure, is the variable used 
to represent the costs of funds, measured by the ratio of interest expenses and cash 
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dividends to total asset. Higher values of CAPEX are expected to be associated with 
higher default risk. The model includes the lagged value of the dependent variable, as in 
previous papers on default risk (Hsu et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2017) 
because it is persistent over time.  Industry dummies are also included.  
The use of panel data methodology enables controlling for individual heterogeneity 
(individual effect, 
𝑖,𝑡
) and for time heterogeneity (𝑢𝑖,𝑡), measured by the time dummy 
variables. The model also includes a random disturbance term, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. The dynamic model 
is estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM); more specifically, the 
system GMM, which provides a consistent, and efficient estimator (Arellano and Bond, 
1991) using instrumental variables and a two-step estimator with robust standard errors. 
This provides a means to address potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables in 
the model, controlling two possible sources (Wooldridge, 2010), omitted variables and 
reverse causality. In addition, the third source of endogeneity, measurement error, may 
be solved by using the best proxies to quantify the model variables. The recognized 
advantages of the BSM default-risk measure help to minimize this problem. The choice 
of instruments in this case is based on the need to comply with two conflicting 
requirements: exogeneity and strength (Wintoki et al., 2012). In order to decide how many 
lags to use as instruments, we take into account these two requirements. If the lags are 
longer, the instruments will be more exogenous but also weaker. Therefore, we choose 
conservative instruments, using the lags from t-2 to t-5, and from t-1 to t-4 for the 
dependent and the explanatory variables, respectively, in the equations in differences.  For 
the equations in levels we use the lag in t-2 and t-1 for the dependent and explanatory 
variables, respectively.  
Some specification tests are also included. One is the Hansen statistic, which is used 
to detect over-identifying restrictions by testing for the absence of correlation between 
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the instruments and the random disturbance and is asymptotically distributed as 2.  First- 
and second-order serial correlation tests, m1 and m2, respectively, indicate the absence of 
correlation between the residuals in first differences. The tests are asymptotically 
distributed as N (0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The m2 statistic is calculated 
following Arellano and Bond (1991). 
The analysis also includes Wald tests of the joint significance of the explanatory 
variables (z1), the time dummy variables (z2), and industry dummy variables (z3), 
respectively. These statistics are asymptotically distributed as a 2 under the null 
hypothesis of no joint significance.  
4.2. Results 
Table 1 contains the mean, standard deviations and correlations, for the variables 
used throughout the study. With respect to our main variable of interest, FamOwn, it can 
be seen that, on average, families hold 11% of the firm’s voting rights, while institutional 
investors hold 66%. According to results reported by Jafarinejad et al. (2015), the 
proportion of institutional ownership in the U.S. market ranges from 60% in the 2000s to 
66% by the end of 2010, which is in line with our data. Furthermore, the percentage of 
shares held by bank trusts (38%) is higher on average than that held by institutional 
advisors (21%). The correlation matrix shows that family ownership is negatively 
correlated with both default risk and institutional holdings. Overall, the correlations 
among the explanatory variables are not too high and the variance inflation factor is less 
than 5 for all the variables included in each model, thus ruling out multicollinearity.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Panel A in Table 2 gives the differences in the mean values of the variables between 
companies with significant (5% threshold) vs. low family ownership. One noteworthy 
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observation is that default risk is lower in firms with significant levels of family 
ownership, as is the level of institutional ownership. Family-owned firms are also smaller, 
less indebted, less volatile and less burdened with capital expenditures. Panel B in Table 
2 compares the mean values of the variables between companies with high vs. low (i.e., 
above- vs. below-average) institutional ownership percentages. Lower default risk is 
observed in firms with high institutional presence, although the difference is not 
statistically significant. The results show that, on average, companies with higher 
institutional ownership are larger, more volatile, and less burdened with capital 
expenditures, and also have lower family ownership percentages.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 shows the results from the estimation of the model (equation 2), which 
analyses the relationship between default risk, and family ownership. The first column 
shows the results without institutional investor effects, while column two shows those 
obtained when institutional ownership is considered. The negative coefficient of family 
ownership found in the reported estimations supports Hypothesis 1 by confirming the 
predicted role of family owners in reducing default risk.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Column 3 presents the results for the moderating effect of institutional ownership. 
The coefficients of family ownership (-0.0185) and the institutional ownership dummy (-
0.0131) are negative and significant. The results also show that institutional ownership 
positively moderates the effect of family ownership on default risk (0.0287). Thus, the 
effect of the presence of family shareholders is to increase default risk in firms where the 
level of institutional ownership is high (0.0102) and reduce default risk in those where it 
is low (-0.0185). The coefficients on the effect of family ownership on default risk for 
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each group is summarised in the Appendix. This result supports Hypothesis 2a that 
ownership by institutional investors moderates the default risk-reducing effect of family 
ownership, as conflicts caused by fractional ownership and the family’s SEW lead family 
owners to the undue appropriation of funds. 
As already stated, in testing Hypothesis 2b, we consider two types of institutional 
investors with contrasting degrees of investment stability: bank trusts and institutional 
advisors. Table 4 shows the results of the estimation of the model when the variable 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is replaced with two dummies, BT and IA. Columns 1 and 2 show the 
positive moderating role of bank trusts and institutional advisors, respectively. In other 
words, higher levels of institutional ownership lead family owners towards higher levels 
of default risk. To check for differences between the two investor types, Column 3 shows 
the results of the estimation including both types and their interactions with family 
ownership. The default risk-intensifying effect of family ownership is found to be greatest 
when both types of shareholdings are high (0.033) and to be at its lowest when both are 
low (-0.0204). Furthermore, in support of Hypothesis 2b, it is found to increase more 
when a significant share is held by bank trusts (0.0210) than when institutional advisors 
play a prominent role (-0.0085). Significantly, therefore, it emerges that, whereas, in the 
presence of bank trusts, family ownership is positively related to default risk, in the 
presence of institutional advisors, the relationship remains negative. This result suggests, 
overall, that investors are predisposed to participate in firm management and that family 
owners come into greater conflict for control of the business with stable than with short-
term institutional investors. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Finally, Table 5 shows the findings for Hypothesis 2c. The results shown in column 
1 indicate that a more significant presence of institutional investors intensifies the family 
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ownership effect on default risk to a greater extent during the financial crisis (0.0455) 
than during the rest of the period (0.0133). This provides support for Hypothesis 2c, which 
predicts that, under economic downturns, family owners’ action to protect their SEW 
conflicts with the purely economic goals of institutional investors, and default risk thus 
increases. These results are in line with previous studies reporting a positive association 
between family firms and economic downturns. For instance, Alonso-Dos Santos and 
Llanos-Contreras (2019) document that a major shock can provoke family firms to make 
riskier decisions. Lins et al. (2013) and Zhou et al. (2017) observe that family-controlled 
firms underperform significantly during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Lins et al. (2013) 
show that, in times of financial shocks, family firms are driven by their survival instinct 
to reduce asset expenditure and invest in ailing businesses belonging to the family, 
thereby diluting the equity value of outside shareholders. Zhou et al. (2017) also find 
evidence of disinvestment by family firms during times of crisis, claiming that 
unqualified family members lead to unqualified management, the consequences of which 
emerge in adverse economic conditions. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Our results also show that, although, during the financial crisis, the family ownership 
effect on default risk was at its highest in firms with high proportions of institutional 
shareholders (0.0455), it was at its lowest in those without (-0.0213). This suggests that 
family owners’ action to protect their SEW does not increase the firm’s default risk unless 
it creates conflict with other significant investors. This is in line with previous arguments 
regarding the resilience of family owners when faced with adversities. According to AT, 
companies with family ownership typically obtain better terms in debt-contracts 
(Anderson et al., 2003) thereby easing solvency pressures and financial flexibility, as 
observed by Crespi and Martin-Oliver (2015). Therefore, the predicted reaction of family-
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owned firms to adverse circumstances varies with the presence/absence of potential 
conflict in family firms with large institutional holdings.   
Column 2 in Table 5 gives the combined results for Hypotheses 2b and 2c which 
relate to possible variation in the effect of family ownership on default risk between the 
crisis and non-crisis periods in firms with a significant presence of both types of 
institutional investors. The results show that, whereas during the financial crisis the 
default risk-intensifying effect of family ownership is greater (0.038) in firms with a 
significant presence of institutional advisors than those with significant levels of bank-
trust ownership (0.007), the reverse effect occurs during the non-crisis period, when the 
coefficients are 0.032 for bank trust ownership and -0.012 for the presence of institutional 
advisors. This is in line with the findings of Switzer and Wang (2017) who find that during 
the financial crisis the positive effect of long-term institutional investors on CDS spreads, 
is reduced, while the effect of short-term institutional investors is increased. They suggest 
that stable institutional investors have fewer risk-shifting incentives during the crisis, 
when their greatest concern is for the firm’s survival. Thus, it is during the crisis period 
that family owners and bank trusts align their interests, thereby reducing their conflicts 
and, consequently, default risk (0.007 vs. 0.032). The opposite occurs with institutional 
advisors, whose short-term orientation and lack of other business ties to preserve (Sakaki 
and Jory, 2019) lead them into greater conflict with family owners during the crisis, 
thereby increasing default risk (0.038 vs. -0.012).  
5. Robustness Checks and Extensions  
5.1. Endogeneity Issues 
Although the system GMM has been proved to deal both with omitted variables and 
reverse causality issues, the reverse causality between family ownership and default risk 
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is a major source of endogeneity requiring special attention. We address this issue using 
instrumental variables two-stage least square (IV-2SLS) estimation as in Lee et al. (2018) 
or Anderson and Reeb (2003a), among others. Following Faccio et al. (2011), Nguyen 
(2011) and Lee et al. (2018), we use two instrumental variables for family ownership: 
average family ownership across all other firms in the same industry, and the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s age. As explained in the cited works, these instruments are 
exogenous and closely related to the firm’s family ownership. We present the results of 
the estimation in Table 6. As can be observed, the results are, overall, consistent with and 
similar to our prior results. The effect of family ownership is significant and positively 
moderated by the significant presence of institutional investors. We also find that the 
moderating influence of institutional ownership is greater in the case of long-term 
institutional owners and during economic downturns. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
5.2. Alternative Measures of Default Risk 
5.2.1. BSM specifications 
When applying expression (1) to estimate the probability of default, notice that we 
need to know debt maturity, T, and face value of debt, D. Given that most companies have 
various debts with different maturities, it is necessary to aggregate all debts into a single 
zero-coupon bond, to enable application of the Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing 
model.  
With respect to the first selected variable, debt maturity, as far as we know, all papers 
using the BSM model use T = 1 year (see among others Crouhy et al., 2000; Crosbie and 
Bohn, 2003; Hillegeist et al., 2004; Vassalou and Xing, 2004 and Gharghori et al., 2006). 
Moreover, Gharghori et al. (2006) indicate that a maturity of more than one year is 
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difficult to justify. In addition, KMV shows a sharp increase in the slope of the probability 
of default only between 1 and 2 years prior to default (see Crouhy et al., 2000). Thus, we 
select T=1 in our main analysis. 
With respect to the default point, Vassalou and Xing (2004) follow KMV by using 
50 percent of long-term debt. Another reason for their decision, as pointed out by Crouhy 
et al. (2000), is that Moody’s KMV sets the default point at the par value of short-term 
debt plus half the long-term debt, having observed, in a sample of several hundred 
companies, that firms default when their asset value reaches a point somewhere between 
the value of their total liabilities and that of their short-term debt. Following these ideas, 
we also take, in our main analysis, default point as short-term debt plus half the long-term 
debt.  
However, Vassalou and Xing (2004) noted that the amount of long-term debt to be 
entered is arbitrary. Therefore, we examine whether the choice of default point affects the 
estimation of our hypotheses. Panels A and B in Table 7 offer a summary of the different 
estimations when considering T = 1 default probability and two different default point 
alternatives, specifically taking into account half of the short-term debt plus the whole of 
the long-term debt, as in Chiang et al. (2015), and with the default point as the whole of 
the debt, as in Crosbie and Bond (2003) and Hillegeist et al. (2004). The results can be 
seen to hold with respect to those obtained when proxying the default point with short-
term debt plus half the long-term debt.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
5.2.2. Alternatives to BSM: Shortfall 
As an alternative to the BSM measure, we can consider other measures of credit risk. 
Specifically, in order to consider the tail risk, we use the firm’s shortfall, measured as the 
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logarithm of the firm’s default point divided by the market value of its assets, in order to 
quantify the difference between the due outstanding liabilities and the asset value. The 
default point, as in the main analysis, is calculated as the short-term debt plus half of the 
long-term debt, and the total assets market value is proxied by the variable VA,t obtained 
by applying the Black-Scholes-Merton model, and also used in expression (1). As can be 
inferred, larger shortfalls are associated with greater default severity.  The results obtained 
using shortfall as the dependent variable, which are summarised in Panel C in Table 7, 
are consistent with those obtained with the BSM default probability, for all four 
hypotheses. 
5.2.3. Alternatives to BSM: Distance to Default 
Another alternative to using the probability of default given by expression (1) is to 
proxy default risk with the distance to default, given by the opposite of the inverse Normal 
distribution of default probability, obtaining in this way an unbounded credit risk 
measure. Given that the interpretation of the distance to default measure is the opposite 
of that of default probability, that is, the greater the distance to default, the lower the 
default risk, we have taken its opposite. We have repeated the analysis using distance to 
default instead of default probability and Panel D in Table 7 summarises the results. The 
sign and coefficients of the principal variables of the analysis remain unchanged. 
5.3. Giant Companies Led by a Strong Leader 
The leadership skills of some managers and/or shareholders is a distinctive firm 
characteristic that relates to the subject of this paper, which is family ownership (and its 
management control capacity) in coexistence with institutional ownership. The level of 
leadership skills could possibly affect the coexistence of different types of investors. In 
order to consider this aspect, we have selected a subgroup of companies fulfilling the 
condition of being giant companies led by a leader. Companies led by a strong leader are 
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identified on the basis of information contained in Forbes’ article “Most innovative 
leaders”6. Next, status as a giant company is determined based on their inclusion in the 
S&P 500 index. This provided us with a subgroup of 15 companies with which to repeat 
the main analyses using a pooled data least squares regression.  
As can be seen in Panel A of Table 8, the main results hold for the subgroup of giant 
companies led by a strong leader. Family ownership clearly reduces default risk and, this 
effect is moderated by the coexistence of family and institutional investors. With respect 
to the results for the individual influence of different types of institutional investors, there 
is no significant interaction with the most stable institutional investors (BT). This may be 
related to the fact that, due to their strong charisma, the leaders of these companies 
encounter only short-term institutional investors (IA). The results for the model including 
the crisis effect show that, while default risk is reduced both by family and institutional 
ownership during the crisis, their coexistence has no significant impact. Again, this lack 
of significance may be due to the leader’s ability to prevail at critical moments7. Note that 
certain characteristics of this subgroup are closely associated with board behaviour. 
Specific aspects of board characteristics, not closely examined here, would provide an 
interesting topic for future research using more detailed and widely sourced data.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
To check for the potential influence of this subgroup on our initial results, we repeat 
the analysis excluding giant companies led by a strong leader. Panel B of Table 8 also 
summarises the results obtained, and they are like those for the whole sample. Thus, we 
can confirm that our main results are not biased by that set of companies. 
 
6 https://www.forbes.com/lists/innovative-leaders/#4fbd06426aa9 
7 The number of coefficients to be estimated in the last two models increases considerably. Therefore, 
caution is required when interpreting the results from few observations. 
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5.4. Family Ownership, Risk-Taking and Default Risk Relationships 
In our main analysis we first assume a link between family ownership and risk-
taking, and then with default risk. However, the paths of this relationship are likely to be 
complex. In this section we try to develop these aspects more fully. 
 According to Hiebl (2012), the propensity of the family to assume risk is not clear 
since it seems to depend on several factors that may have counteracting effects. Some of 
them may be the family’s involvement, goals and behaviours, family manager 
characteristics, firm characteristics or the environment (La Porta et al., 1999) and 
competition (legal protection of minority shareholders, Burkart et al., 2003, or their loss 
aversion, rather than on their risk aversion, Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). 
Firstly, in his meta-analysis Hiebl (2012) indicates that most papers show family 
firms to be more risk-averse than non-family firms. This risk-aversion is explained by the 
high degree of family involvement in the business (Memili et al., 2011; Le Breton-Miller 
et al., 2011; Anderson et al., 2012), the family’s long-term orientation aimed at achieving 
the firm’s survival (Lumpkin et al., 2010; Bianco et al., 2013) and the undiversified 
portfolio of family owners (Morck and Yeung, 2003; Zellweger and Sieger, 2012).  
However, some studies find that family firms are willing to accept the risk involved in 
their strategies in order to achieve competitive advantages, which bring performance 
gains but also higher risk (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Maury, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 
2006; Nguyen, 2011). In answer to this controversy, some studies suggest that the 
relationship between risk-taking and family ownership might not be linear, assuming 
instead that higher levels of risk are a feature of higher levels of ownership (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003b, or Lee et al., 2018). 
Secondly, the relationship between risk-taking and default risk, that is, how risk-
taking translates into default risk, is not obvious. The family’s risk aversion measured by 
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its risk-taking activities leads to several firm outcomes, such as capital structure, business 
strategy (kind and time of investments) or performance, as explained by Hiebl (2012). 
Indeed, Hoskisson et al., (2017) show that some risk-taking measures can alternatively 
identify the same factor either as a driver or as an inhibitor of firm risk.  
Default risk includes operational and financial risks arising from two areas of firm 
risk-taking decisions closely linked to default risk: namely, financing (capital structure) 
and investment (business strategy). With respect to financing decisions, there are two 
opposing perspectives; some papers find that family firms are risk-averse, and thus 
present lower indebtedness (De Angelo and De Angelo, 2000), while others find a 
positive relationship between family ownership and leverage (Croci et al., 2011 or Keasey 
et al., 2015), which they interpret as a preference of public family businesses for debt 
versus equity financing. When it comes to investment decisions, family shareholders are 
likely to favour projects that will enable the continuity of the company, avoid high-risk 
investments and pursue long-term plans (Miller et al., 2008; Anderson et al., 2012). 
Family firms are generally less inclined to invest in risky projects such as R&D (Croci et 
al., 2011; Anderson et al., 2012; Su and Lee, 2013) or to engage in internationalization 
plans (George et al., 2005) and they also have higher levels of capital expenditures (Le 
Breton-Miller et al., 2011 or Anderson et al., 2012). In general, riskier investment policies 
increase the probability of business failure (Kuang and Qin, 2013), but even cautious 
investment decisions can have a negative impact on performance, since they might result 
in missed opportunities for firm growth. There is also a lack of consensus in the literature 
as to the nature of the relationship between investment horizons and risk, long-term 
projects being associated with uncertainty and increased risk (Rottke and Thiele, 2018).  
Our selected measure of default risk captures the effect of risk-taking on different 
firm outcomes, namely, capital structure, performance and investment expectations, by 
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taking firm’s leverage, expected rate of return and market value of assets as inputs. Given 
the lack of papers directly analysing firms’ credit risk, the possibility of a relationship 
between family ownership, risk-taking and default risk is an empirical question. 
Following previous papers (Lee et al., 2018; Nguyen, 2011 and 2012), we measure 
the firm’s business risk or risk-taking using total risk (measured as the annualized 
standard deviation of daily stock returns during the past twelve months), and idiosyncratic 
risk (measured as the annualized standard deviation of the residuals of Fama-French 3-
factor model and of the CAPM model). We first analyse the effects of family ownership 
on risk-taking, and then the effect of risk-taking on default risk. In unreported analyses, 
available from the authors upon request, we find that, in line with our main arguments 
and results, one way by which family ownership reduces the firm’s credit risk is by 
reducing risk-taking. However, default risk is a wider concept, which also encompasses 
the capacity to generate future resources. Future research might therefore attempt further 
elaboration of the concept by using various alternative measures of risk-taking and taking 
into account the various potential effects of the particularities of family-owned firms, 
such as multi-generational ownership, the presence of non-family managers, the age and 
tenure of family managers or family ownership concentration, among others. 
5.5. Family Ownership and Default Risk: Non-Linear Relationship 
The coexistence of family and institutional owners and its effect on default risk is a 
form of non-linear relationship between family ownership and default risk based on the 
proportion of institutional ownership. However, there may exist another non-linear 
relationship between family ownership and default risk based on the proportion owned 
by the family.  
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We study the possibility of a non-linear relationship between family ownership and 
default risk following Lee et al. (2018)8. Table 9 shows the results of the estimations. We 
find a non-linear relationship between family ownership and default risk using the two 
alternatives applied by Lee at al. (2018). With the quadratic alternative, the inflexion 
point is 63.08%. That is, credit risk decreases with family ownership stakes below 
63.08%, but starts to increase with stakes beyond that level. These results support a non-
linear relationship between family ownership and default risk similar to that indicated by 
other relationships between family ownership and risk-taking, (Lee et al., 2018); 
performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a); or managerial control (Burkart et al., 2003).  
Thus, our results indicate that the dampening effect of family ownership on default risk 
disappears with the family’s entrenchment. This is in line with the seminal work of 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) which describes the entrenchment of major shareholders 
having obtained almost full control of the company and acquired the power to expropriate 
minority shareholders by pursuing their own private benefits. The maximization of 
private benefits, rather than firm value, will then increase the probability of business 
failure. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
These results suggest that the effect of family ownership on default risk is not 
uniform since it varies with the size of the family’s stake in total ownership. This analysis 
may provide an opportunity for future in-depth research of the non-linear relationship 
between the proportion of shares owned by the family and the firm’s credit risk. 
Additional possibilities would be to study this effect based on the generation effect (first 
 
8 We test this relationship in two different ways. The first is to include the square of family ownership in 
the regression. The second is to include two variables, Fam0_to_50, which equals FamOwn if FamOwn is 
lower than 50.1%, and 50.1% otherwise; and Fam_over_50, which equals FamOwn – 50.1%, if family 
ownership is larger than 50.1% and 0 otherwise. 
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versus second) or the family’s relationship with other investors, such as another family 
group with a significant percentage in the business, or foreign investors.  
6. Conclusions  
Default risk involves various facets of a firm, including firm performance, leverage 
and the capacity to generate future resources, all of which shape the firm’s situation and 
contribute to the construction of a corporate risk estimate. Thus, rather than studying the 
risk-taking decisions of family owners themselves, through their policies on innovation, 
R&D investment, leverage, etc., this paper analyses the outcome of the risk-taking 
activities, measured by the company’s default risk, that is, the probability of the business 
to fail. The central issue of this paper is to explain how the role of family owners in default 
risk is influenced by co-ownership with institutional investors, since conflict can arise 
between these two groups of investors, who have different aims for the firm. In 
investigating this relationship, we also take into account the type of institutional investors 
and the effect of an economic downturn. 
Based on a sample of 541 public U.S. firms for a 15-year period and proxying default 
risk with the Black-Scholes-Merton model, this paper confirms the expected negative 
relationship between family ownership and default risk. This first finding is consistent 
with the AT and the SEW perspective that predict family owners to have a greater 
capacity to monitor managers and the firm’s choices, a risk-averse profile, a long-term 
goal horizon, an emotional attachment to the business, and a deep concern for firm 
survival. 
The results further indicate that this inverse relationship is not immutable. The 
presence of institutional investors makes family shareholders more protective of their 
SEW and prone to take decisions in misalignment with their co-owners, thereby 
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increasing the firm’s default risk. The conflict intensifies in the presence of stable 
institutional investors who are more motivated to control management; and when adverse 
financial circumstances increase the disparity of interests between the two groups of 
investors.   
Overall, this analysis extends previous evidence on default risk, taking into account 
the role played by ownership structure, particularly with respect to family shareholders, 
which appear to be important determinants. We also highlight the danger of relying on 
simplistic classifications, given that factors which pose a threat to the family’s non-
economic goals appear to play a decisive role in the analysis. 
This paper has various implications. From the academic perspective, the results 
suggest that, as well as the traditional variables, measures of default risk should also 
include some relating to investor behaviour. This is especially relevant for firms with 
significant family ownership, where risk-taking decisions with repercussions for default 
risk are driven not only by financial factors but also by non-economic goals. Regulatory 
and policy implications can also be drawn, since rules and policies encouraging specific 
ownership structures would help to reduce default costs and financial costs in the global 
economy. To the extent that they can be adopted in other contexts, some family-firm 
characteristics might help to control default risk both in the corporate sector and in the 




Appendix. Summary of the effect of family ownership on default risk 
 




0.0102 (1+2) -0.018 (1) 
This table presents the effect of family ownership on default risk for high and low levels of institutional ownership. 
The coefficients, shown in parentheses, are obtained from Table 3, column 3. 
 
Table A2. The Moderating Effect of Institutional Ownership on the Family 








0.0333 (1+2+3+4) -0.0085 (1+3) 
Low 0.021 (1+2) -0.0204 (1) 
This table presents the effect of family ownership on default risk for high and low ownership by different types of 
institutional investors. The coefficients, shown in parentheses are obtained from Table 4, column 3. 
 
Table A3. The Moderating Effect of Institutional Ownership on the Family 








0.0455 (1+2+5+6) 0.0133 (1+2) 
Low -0.0213 (1+5) 0 (1) 
This table presents the effect of family ownership on default risk for high and low levels of institutional ownership for 
the crisis and non-crisis period. The coefficients, shown in parentheses, are obtained from Table 5, column 1. 
 
Table A4. The Moderating Effect of a Significant Level of Institutional Ownership 
on the Family Ownership-Default Risk Relationship for Different Types of 









0.007 (1+3+5+7) 0.032 (1+3) 
Institutional 
Advisors 
0.038 (1+4+5+8) -0.012 (1+4) 
This table presents the effect of family ownership on default risk for high levels of different types of institutional 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Default risk 0.01 0.08          
2. FamOwn 0.11 0.17 -0.04***         
3. InstitOwn 0.66 0.31 0.02 -0.34***        
4. Bank Trust 0.38 0.18 -0.03** -0.24*** 0.83***       
5. Institutional Advisors 0.21 0.17 0.08*** -0.29*** 0.76*** 0.34***      
6. Size 14.60 1.24 0.00 -0.18*** 0.08*** 0.11*** -0.03**     
7. Roa 0.03 0.06 -0.26*** 0.02* -0.04*** 0.02* -0.14*** -0.05***    
8. Leverage 0.29 0.19 0.17*** -0.07*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.30*** -0.27***   
9. Volatility 0.34 0.17 0.40*** -0.03** 0.11*** 0.00 0.18*** -0.21*** -0.27*** -0.03**  
10. Capex 0.03 0.02 0.05*** -0.07*** -0.14*** -0.09*** -0.18*** 0.12*** -0.02 0.54*** -0.14*** 




Table 2. Differences of Means Tests 
Panel A. High versus Low Family Ownership (5% threshold)  
 High  Low  t-statistic 
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡  0.0128 0.0189 2.3051
** 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡  14.3424 14.7812 11.4357
*** 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 0.0417 0.0387 -1.4929 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  0.2714 0.3030 5.1012
*** 
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 0.3324 0.3508 3.3273
*** 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 0.0319 0.0363 4.8327
*** 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡  0.5237 0.7534 24.5509
*** 
Panel B. High versus Low Institutional Ownership  
 High  Low  t-statistic 
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡  0.0157 0.0175 0.6873 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡  14.7239 14.4589 -6.9434
*** 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 0.0404 0.0393 -0.5723 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  0.2870 0.29530 1.3450 
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 0.3526 0.3317 -3.8296
*** 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 0.0311 0.0391 9.0468
*** 
𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡  0.0585 0.1799 23.3140
*** 
Panel A contains the differences on the model’s variables between firms with more than 5% 
family ownership (39.19 % observations), and firms with lower family ownership (60.81%). 
Panel B contains the differences on the model’s variables between firms with high institutional 
ownership (56.73 % observations), and firms with low institutional ownership (43.27%).  The 
t-statistic is the difference of means test under the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ - 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑤 = 




Table 3. Default Risk, Family Ownership and Institutional Ownership 
Dep. var.: Default Riski,t 1 2 3 












FamOwn*InstitOwn (2)   0.0287*** 
(0.0009) 








































Wald tests    
w1   155.69*** 
z1 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
z2 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
z3 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Specification tests    
m1 (p-value) (0.039) (0.041) (0.029) 
m2 (p-value) (0.606) (0.651) (0.520) 
Hansen (p-value) (0.025) (0.309) (0.463) 
This table presents the coefficients of the estimation with the system GMM. The dependent variable is the probability 
of default given by the Black-Scholes-Merton model. Time and sector dummies are included but not reported. Robust 
standard errors are in parenthesis. W1 is a Wald lineal restriction test, where the null hypothesis states that the sum of 
the coefficients of family ownership and its interaction with institutional ownership is equal to zero. z1, z2 and z3 are 
Wald tests of the joint significance of the explanatory variables, the time, and sector dummies, respectively. mi is an ith 
order serial correlation test using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as 2 under the null of 





Table 4. Default Risk, Family Ownership and Type of Institutional Investor 
Dep. var.: Default Riski,t 1 2 3 























Institutional Advisor (4) 
  -0.0035 
(0.0032) 








Bank Trust * Institutional 
Advisor 






































Wald tests    
w1 3,432.75***  167.58*** 
w2  305.62*** 21.02*** 
w3   146.81*** 
z1 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
z2 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
z3 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Specification tests    
m1 (p-value) (0.033) (0.034) (0.041) 
m2 (p-value) (0.469) (0.558) (0.523) 
Hansen (p-value) (0.416) (0.490) (0.440) 
The dependent variable, estimation method and specification tests are explained in Table 3. wi are Wald lineal 
restriction tests. The null hypothesis of w1 states that the sum of the coefficients of family ownership and its interaction 
with bank trust is equal to zero. The null hypothesis of w2 states that the sum of the coefficients of family ownership 
and its interaction with institutional advisors is equal to zero. The null hypothesis of w3 states that the interaction of 
family ownership with bank trust minus the interaction of family ownership with institutional advisors is equal to zero. 







Table 5. Default Risk, Family Ownership, Institutional Investors and Financial Crisis 
Dep. var.: Default Riski,t 1 2 




FamOwn (1) 0.0001 
(0.0006) 
  0.0095*** 
(0.0010) 
FamOwn*InstitOwn (2) 0.0133*** 
(0.0010) 
 
FamOwn*Bank Trust (3)    0.0232*** 
(0.0019) 
FamOwn*Institutional Advisors (4)  -0.0221*** 
(0.0022) 




FamOwn*InstitOwn*Crisis (6) 0.0535*** 
(0.0045) 
 









Bank Trust * Crisis  -0.0133*** 
(0.0022) 





Bank Trust  -0.0037*** 
(0.0006) 






























w1 316.61***  
w2  31.38*** 
z1 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) 
z2 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) 
m1 (p-value) (0.009) (0.016) 
m2 (p-value) (0.349) (0.421) 
Hansen (p-value) (0.364) (0.265) 
The dependent variable, estimation method and specification tests are explained in Table 3. Sector dummies are included 
but not reported. Wi are Wald lineal restriction tests. The null hypothesis of w1 states that the sum of the coefficients of the 
interaction of family ownership with institutional ownership, the interaction of family ownership with crisis and the 
interaction of family ownership with institutional ownership and crisis is equal to zero. The null hypothesis of w2 states 
that the sum of the coefficients of family ownership and its interaction with institutional advisors is equal to zero. z1 and z2 
are Wald tests of the joint significance of the explanatory variables, and sector dummies, respectively. *** denotes 
coefficients that are significant at the 1 per cent level.  
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Table 6. Estimations using IV-2SLS Method 
Dep. var.: Default Riski,t H1 H2a H2b H2c 












FamOwn*Bank Trust   0.1355*** 
(0.0341) 
 
FamOwn*Institutional Advisors    0.0582 
(0.0710) 
 
FamOwn*Bank Trust * Institutional Advisors   0.1048 
(0.1293) 
 
FamOwn*Crisis     -0.7478*** 
(0.1906) 
FamOwn*InstitOwn*Crisis     1.1428*** 
(0.2615) 








Bank Trust   -0.0237*** 
(0.0058) 
 
Institutional Advisors   -0.0164* 
(0.0092) 
 
Bank Trust * Institutional Advisor   0.0105 
(0.0105) 
 


















































Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes No 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 4,271 4,271 4,271 4,271 
R-square 0.2239 0.2222 0.2054 0.0836 
This table presents the two-stage least square estimation using two instrumental variables for family ownership: the 
average family ownership across all other firms in the same industry, and the natural logarithm of the firm’s age. The 
dependent variable is the probability of default given by the Black-Scholes-Merton model. Columns H1, H2a, H2b 
and H2c show the results for Hypotheses H1, H2a, H2b and H2c, respectively. Sector and year dummies are included 




Table 7. Estimations with Different Dependent Variables 
Panel A. Dependent variable: BSM with the default point as half of short-term debt plus long-term 
debt 
 H1 H2a H2b H2c 
FamOwn  -0.0043*** -0.0137*** -0.0184*** 0.0142*** 
FamOwn*InstitOwn  0.0279***  0.0113*** 
FamOwn*Bank Trust   0.0406***  
FamOwn*Institutional Advisors    0.0272***  
FamOwn*Bank Trust * Institutional Advisors   -0.0175***  
FamOwn*Crisis     -0.0547*** 
FamOwn*InstitOwn*Crisis     0.0846*** 
Panel B. Dependent variable: BSM with the default point as total debt 
 H1 H2a H2b H2c 
FamOwn  -0.0090*** -0.0144*** -0.0133*** 0.0166*** 
FamOwn*InstitOwn  0.0181***  0.0034** 
FamOwn*Bank Trust   0.0387***  
FamOwn*Institutional Advisors    0.0188***  
FamOwn*Bank Trust * Institutional Advisors   -0.0111**  
FamOwn*Crisis       -0.0368*** 
FamOwn*InstitOwn*Crisis     0.0605*** 
Panel C. Dependent variable: Shortfall 
 H1 H2a H2b H2c 
FamOwn    -0.1758*** -0.0672*** -0.1870*** -0.4039*** 
FamOwn*InstitOwn  0.3098***    0.6589*** 
FamOwn*Bank Trust   0.5005***  
FamOwn*Institutional Advisors    0.3384***  
FamOwn*Bank Trust * Institutional Advisors   -0.5322***  
FamOwn*Crisis     -1.5623*** 
FamOwn*InstitOwn*Crisis     1.5781** 
Panel D. Dependent variable: Distance to default 
 H1 H2a H2b H2c 
FamOwn  -0.0026*** -0.0011* -0.0068*** -0.0123*** 
FamOwn*InstitOwn  0.0047***  0.0134*** 
FamOwn*Bank Trust   0.0163***  
FamOwn*Institutional Advisors    0.0046**  
FamOwn*Bank Trust * Institutional Advisors   0.0121***  
FamOwn*Crisis     -0.0276** 
FamOwn*InstitOwn*Crisis     0.0320** 
This table contains a summary with the coefficients and statistical significance of the variable of interest to test the 
hypotheses with different measures of default risk. Columns H1, H2a, H2b and H2c show the results for Hypotheses 
H1, H2a, H2b and H2c, respectively. The estimation method is explained in Table 3. In Panel A, the dependent variable 
is the probability of default given by the Black-Scholes-Merton model taking half of short-term debt plus long-term 
debt as the default point. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the probability of default given by the Black-Scholes-
Merton model with total debt as the default point. In Panel C, the dependent variable is the shortfall in case of default, 
measured by the logarithm of the default point to market value of assets ratio. In Panel D, the dependent variable is the 
opposite of the distance to default given by the Black-Scholes-Merton model. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 





Table 8. Estimations with Different Subsamples  
Panel A. Subsample of giant companies led by a strong leader 
 H1 H2a H2b H 
FamOwn  -0.0312** -0.0728*** -0.0026** 0.0001 
FamOwn*InstitOwn  0.0808**  -0.0002 
FamOwn*Bank Trust   0.0023  
FamOwn*Institutional Advisors    0.0030*  
FamOwn*Bank Trust * Institutional Advisors   -0.0015  
FamOwn*Crisis     -0.0049*** 
FamOwn*InstitOwn*Crisis     0.0060 
Panel B. SubSample excluding giant companies led by a strong leader 
 H1 H2a H2b H2c 
FamOwn  -0.0137*** -0.0214*** -0.0257*** 0.0001 
FamOwn*InstitOwn  0.0322***  0.0134*** 
FamOwn*Bank Trust   0.0452***  
FamOwn*Institutional Advisors    0.0200***  
FamOwn*Bank Trust * Institutional Advisors   -0.0068**  
FamOwn*Crisis     -0.0262*** 
FamOwn*InstitOwn*Crisis     0.0614*** 
This table summarises the main coefficients of the models using two different subsamples. The dependent variable is 
the probability of default given by the Black-Scholes-Merton model. Columns H1, H2a, H2b and H2c show the results 
for Hypotheses H1, H2a, H2b and H2c, respectively. Panel A shows the PLS coefficients for the subsample of giant 
companies led by a strong leader. The coefficients of H1 and H2 are multiplied by 103 and their standard errors by 102. 
Panel B shows the system GMM coefficients for the subsample excluding giant companies led by a strong leader. 






Table 9. Non-linear Relationship between Family Ownership and Default risk 
Dep. var.: Default Riski,t 1 2 










Fam to 50  -0.0237*** 
(0.0003) 






























z1 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) 
z2 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) 
z3 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) 
m1 (p-value) (0.038) (0.036) 
m2 (p-value) (0.585) (0.537) 
Hansen (p-value) (0.371) (0.269) 
The estimation method, specification tests and Wald test of joint significance are explained in Table 3. 
The dependent variable is the probability of default given by the Black-Scholes-Merton model. 
Fam0_to_50, which equals FamOwn if FamOwn is lower than 50.1%, and 50.1% otherwise; and 
Fam_over_50, which equals FamOwn– 50.1%, if family ownership is larger than 50.1% and 0 
otherwise. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***denotes coefficients significant at the 1 per cent 
level.  
 
  
